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United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott'
During the mid-1950's to mid-1970's, civil rights issues took a forefront in
the legal and political arena. During this period, several Reconstruction Era
acts were revived by court decisions. 2 One of the most misunderstood of the
civil rights statutes is 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).' A recent United States Supreme
Court case shed substantial light on the statute. In United Brotherhood of
Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott,4 the Court held that a group of non-union
workers were not protected by section 1985(3) because the statute does not
1. 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983).
2. After the ratification of the thirteenth amendment, organizations arose to
oppose equality between blacks and whites. The most notorious of these groups was the
Ku Klux Klan. Congress responded by enacting a series of civil rights laws: Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140; Force Act of
1871, 16 Stat. 433; Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871), 17 Stat. 13;
and Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335.
Many of these laws have been resurrected in recent court decisions. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (holding that 42 U.S.C. §
1981 reaches private racial discrimination in contractual relations); Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 reaches private racial
discrimination in property transactions); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (hold-
ing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment).
3. (1976). The statute provides a damages remedy to persons injured where
two or more persons conspire for the purpose of depriving any person or class of per-
sons of, the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the
law and an act is done in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy whereby another
is injured.
The statute is a codification of section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 17
Stat. 13. The Supreme Court did not address the statute until 1951. In Collins v.
Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), the Court required state action for a section 1985(3)
cause of action. Consequently, the statute remained dormant because 42 U.S.C. § 1983
already provided a civil remedy for constitutional violations by state actors. In Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Court first allowed an action against private
persons under section 1985(3). In Griffin, black plaintiffs were prevented from exercis-
ing their constitutional right to interstate travel. In granting relief, the Court left only
vague guidelines as to when section 1985(3) reaches private conduct. For example,
after ruling that section 1985(3) does cover private conspiracies, the Court stated that
their conclusion did not mean that section 1985(3) applies to all tortious, conspiratorial
interferences with the rights of others. Id. at 101. See generally Esbeck & Schumaker,
Current Practice Under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985 and 1986, BARRISTER, Fall 1984, at
34.
4. 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983).
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SECTION 1985(3)
reach private conspiracies to deprive one of first amendment rights or conspir-
acies based upon economic bias.' As a result, the Court implicitly overruled a
growing body of lower court decisions which were expanding section 1985(3)
protection. 6 The application of section 1985(3) is now limited by Scott in two
areas: rights protecte4 and classes protected.
In Scott, the Cross Construction Company (Cross) brought in non-union
workers for a construction project near Port Arthur, Texas. 7 Cross had no
collective bargaining agreement with any labor union and none were seeking
to organize the company. Nevertheless, several local residents warned Cross
employees that continued hiring of non-union workers would lead to grave
consequences.
At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Sabine Area Building
and Construction Trades Council, a union respresentative announced a citizen
protest against Cross's hiring practices. 8 Two days later, a large group of
union members and supporters assembled near the construction site. Several
truckloads of men emerged from the group and drove onto the site. These men
attacked Cross employees and destroyed construction equipment. Several of
the men made threats of future violence if non-union workers continued on the
job site.
Cross and two of its injured employees brought a section 1985(3) action
in federal district court against the local trades council, twenty-five local un-
ions, and several individuals.9 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had
conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional right of association. The
plaintiffs sought monetary damages and an injunction to restrain future inter-
ference with their right to work in a non-union environment.
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. 10 In reaching its deci-
sion, the court analyzed the five elements of a section 1985(3) action: (1) a
conspiracy; (2) with intent to deprive a person, or class of persons, of equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws;
(3) an invidious, class-based animus; (4) an act in furtherance of the conspir-
acy; and (5) an injury."1 The court found that the conspiracy, act, and injury
5. Id. at 3356.
6. After Griffin v. Breckenridge, lower courts began searching for outer limits
of section 1985(3). Two areas where the courts have sought expansion are the rights
protected and the classes sufficient to meet the Griffin invidious, class-based animus
requirement. Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of its Original
Purpose, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 402, 407 (1979).
7. 103 S. Ct. at 3355.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aft'd, 680 F.2d 979
(5th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom., United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 103 S.
Ct. 3352 (1983).
11. See 461 F. Supp. at 227. The court also addressed the interpretation of the
elements set out in McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.
1977) (en bane). Id. at 228.
1985]
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elements were easily satisfied. More problematic were the issues of deprivation
of a protected right and an invidious, class-based animus motivating the
defendants.
In analyzing the invidious, class-based animus element, the court decided
that section 1985(3) extends beyond racially based conspiracies.12 The court
supported this ruling with statements from legislative history and by contrast-
ing the general language of section 1985(3) with the specific prohibitions
against race discrimination in other civil rights statutes. The court also found
that non-union laborers and employers of non-union laborers have common
characteristics making them a discernible class. 13 Consequently, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs were a class deserving of section 1985(3) protection.
The court also held that the defendants had deprived the plaintiffs of
their first amendment right of association. 4 No explanation was given as to
the constitutional authority for allowing a section 1985(3) recovery when the
deprivation of first amendment rights was by private defendants. Instead, the
court concluded that the defendants' acts of violence were manifestations of
ill-will and hatred toward the plaintiffs based on their non-association with the
union.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.1 5 Fol-
lowing Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc.,16 the court ruled that section 1985(3)
extends beyond racially based conspiracies to encompass at least some conspir-
acies motivated by political or economic bias.17 Because the plaintiffs were
discriminated against based upon their non-association with the union, the
court characterized the class-animus as economic in nature and granted sec-
tion 1985(3) relief. In examining the rights protected by section 1985(3), the
court rejected any state action requirement for recovery under section 1985(3)
for first amendment violations.1 8 Although recognizing that the first amend-
12. 461 F. Supp. at 229.
13. Id. at 230.
14. Id.
15. Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom., United Bhd.
of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983). Though the district court
ruled against eleven local unions, the court of appeals set aside judgment against eight
of the unions because the evidence of their participation in the conspiracy was
insufficient.
16. 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The court in Kimble established
two categories of non-racial classes protected by section 1985(3): (1) those classes af-
forded special protection under the equal protection clause; and (2) those classes whose
members were discriminated against because of their political beliefs or associations.
Id, at 347. It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Scott gave no deference to the
two class distinction established by Kimble.
17. 680 F.2d at 991-96. The court cautioned against an overly broad interpreta-
tion of section 1985(3) and emphasized three limitations on the statute: (1) it cannot
be invoked to disrupt the operation of a comprehensive statutory remedial scheme; (2)
without more, it cannot remedy an unfair labor practice; and (3) it does not cover a
class created solely on the basis of unionism or nonunionism. Id. at 996.
18. 680 F.2d at 990. Because an actual first amendment infringement requires
[Vol. 50
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ment normally provides protection only from infringement by the government,
the court felt compelled to follow the holding in Griffin v. Breckenridge19 that
section 1985(3) reaches both public and private constitutional wrongs.
After construing section 1985(3) as applicable to the plaintiffs' case, the
court of appeals addressed the constitutional source of Congress' power to en-
act section 1985(3).20 The court recognized that the circuits are divided as to
whether section 5 of the fourteenth amendment allows Congress to reach
purely private conduct. 21 Because the United States Supreme Court had yet to
rule on the issue, the court sidestepped the uncertainty of section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment and relied on the commerce clause22 to establish consti-
tutional authority for section 1985(3).23 The court reasoned that attacks on
workers of a construction firm engaged in interstate commerce have a direct
effect on the flow of goods and services among the states.
In a closely divided opinion, the United States Supreme Court reversed.24
The battleground between the majority and minority opinions is found in the
statutory construction of section 1985(3). Two areas of disagreement are ex-
plicit in the opinions. First, the majority disallowed section 1985(3) recovery
for conspiratory activities motivated by economic bias.25 Second, the majority
refused section 1985(3) protection for violations of first amendment rights ab-
sent a showing of state involvement.26 In contrast, the dissent advocated sec-
tion 1985(3) protection for all classes not receiving equal protection of the
laws by local authorities, and protection for violations of first amendment
rights regardless of any showing of state involvement.2 7 By analyzing these
issues, we can better understand the application of section 1985(3) after
Scott.2 8
state action, the court must have meant that the same rights are protected against
private infringement under section 1985(3) as are protected against government in-
fringement under the first amendment.
19. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
20. 680 F.2d at 996.
21. Compare Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc); and
Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that the fourteenth
amendment authorizes Congress to reach purely private conduct) with Murphy v.
Mount Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding it does not).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
23. 680 F.2d at 997.
24. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983)
(White, J.) (joined by Burger, C.J., and Stevens, Rehnquist, and Powell, JJ.).
25. Id. at 3360.
26. Id. at 3357.
27. Id. at 3361.
28. Though there was no disagreement among the justices concerning the con-
stitutional basis of Congressional power to enact section 1985(3) and to use it to reach
private conspiracies, it is helpful to examine the underlying importance of the issue in
guiding the Court's statutory construction. Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, courts have
sought to base congressional power for section 1985(3) on section 5 of the fourteenth
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Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded that section 1985(3)
cannot be used against an infringement of fourteenth amendment rights unless
it is shown that the state was involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the
conspiracy was to influence the state. White explained that section 1985(3) is
purely remedial and that violation of a protected right independent of section
1985(3) must be shown. White then distinguished those rights protected from
private interferences from those protected only from state interference. Be-
cause the plaintiffs showed no state action in the alleged deprivation of their
first amendment right of association, the Court refused a section 1985(3)
remedy.2 9
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, 30 concluded that section
1985(3) provides protection from conspiracies regardless of the presence of
state action. 1 Blackmun asserted that when Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, the Republican majority believed the fourteenth amendment con-
ferred rights which could be violated by private conspirators.32 Blackmun also
explained that the "equal protection" language of section 1985(3) was added
only to avoid creating a general federal criminal law, not to require state
Both the majority and minority opinions in Scott recognized congressional power
to reach purely private conspiracies based upon the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3. Like Griffin, the Court in Scott sidestepped the fourteenth amendment
issue and withheld judgment. 103 S. Ct. at 3358.
Over the years, the commerce clause has been given a very broad interpretation.
See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Because courts will most always be able to rely on the
commerce clause as a basis to justify section 1985(3) reaching private private conspira-
cies, the need to address and decide how far Congress's power extends under section 5
of the fourteenth amendment may never arise.
Regardless of the source the Court gives for congressional power to reach private
conspiracies uner section 1985(3), the more important issue is the effect the source has
upon the Court's statutory construction of section 1985(3). Implicit in every determina-
tion of those rights which are protected by section 1985(3) is the assertion that Con-
gress has the power to reach such prohibited conduct under section 1985(3). Under the
guise of statutory construction, Justice White, writing for the majority in Scott, in
effect rejects congressional power of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to reach
private conspiracies. By refusing section 1985(3) protection for deprivation of four-
teenth amendment rights without a requisite showing of state action, White has forced
the Court to search for an additional source of constitutional power to reach purely
private conspiracies.
29. 103 S. Ct. at 3357. White recognized the Griffin holding that section
1985(3) can reach purely private conspiracies; but White explained that the statute
only reaches those "private conspiracies aimed at interfering with rights constitution-
ally protected against private, as well as official, encroachment." Id. at 3358.
30. Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor.
31. Id. at 3362.
32. Id. at 3365. At the time the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted, the
landmark Civil Rights Cases had not been decided. It was in the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883), that the United States Supreme Court for the first time ruled that
the fourteenth amendment protects individuals' rights only from government infringe-
ment, i.e., state action.
[Vol. 50
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involvement.3 3
Considering the history and purpose of section 1985(3), the majority
opinion correctly limited the application of the statute by requiring state ac-
tion to recover for a fourteenth amendment infringement. Through Scott, the
Court significantly curtailed an effort in the lower federal courts to expand
section 1985(3).
This expansion began with Griffin v. Breckenridge."' In Griffin, black
plaintiffs were traveling on a public highway when they were stopped by the
defendants.35 Believing the auto driver was a civil rights worker, the defen-
dants forced the plaintiffs out of the auto and beat each of them. The Court
allowed section 1985(3) recovery against the private conspirators based upon
deprivation of the plaintiffs' thirteenth amendment right to be free from the
badges of slavery and the deprivation of the constitutional right to travel.36
The Court explained that there is nothing inherent in the section 1985(3)
phrase which requires the deprivation to involve the state.3 7
Because Griffin extended section 1985(3) coverage to include private con-
spiracies, some lower courts began an expansion to allow section 1985(3) re-
covery for the violation of substantive rights regardless of state action require-
ments.38 This approach was exemplified in the Scott decisions in the lower
courts.3 9
This misconception was corrected by the Supreme Court's decision in
Scott. To recover under section 1985(3), one must allege and prove a violation
of an underlying substantive right.4 0 If the underlying substantive right is a
constitutional right, one must next determine if state action is necessary. To
make this determination, look to the source of the underlying substantive
right. For example, to establish a fourteenth amendment violation, state action
has been required since the Civil Rights Cases.,1 This was reaffirmed in
United States v. Guest,42 where private defendants were indicted for a crimi-
33. Id. Blackmun stated that the equal protection language was to alleviate the
fears of the more moderate Republicans who feared that the creation of a general
federal criminal law in section 1985(3) would raise serious constitutional problems. To
create a general federal criminal law would undermine state control over criminal ac-
tions. Id.
34. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
35. Id. at 90.
36. Id. at 103-04. The Court in Scott re-emphasized that the Griffin decision
was not based on infringement of first amendment rights. 103 S. Ct. at 3358.
37. 403 U.S. at 97.
38. See, e.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (sec-
tion 1985(3) protection of fourteenth amendment rights does not require state action);
Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (elimination of any state action
requirement for section 1985(3) jurisdiction).
39. Both the district court and the court of appeals required no state action for
a section 1985(3) suit for violation of first amendment rights. 680 F.2d at 990.
40. 103 S. Ct. at 3357-58.
41. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
42. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
1985]
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nal conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241,"1 often referred to as the crimi-
nal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Upon remanding for further consider-
ation of whether state officials cooperated in the conspiracy, the Court, in
Guest, stressed that the fourteenth amendment protects an individual against
state infringement of constitutional rights and not against private wrongs.44
Therefore, a section 1985(3) action based upon a deprivation of rights guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment requires a showing of state action. To over-
turn this fundamental principle would create chaos in our legal system and
flood the federal courts with cases of private discrimination based upon four-
teenth amendment rights.
In contrast, state action is not required for a section 1985(3) cause of
action based upon a conspiracy to interfere with one's thirteenth amendment
right to be free from badges of slavery.45 Likewise, a section 1985(3) action
based upon deprivation of the constitutional right to travel46 or other rights of
national citizenship provided by the privileges and immunities clause4" re-
quires no showing of state action. These bases were established in Griffin and
reaffirmed in Scott.
Beyond these examples involving constitutional rights, the Court previ-
ously has given a few additional guidelines involving statutory rights as an
underlying basis for a section 1985(3) cause of action. In Great American
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny,48 the Court implicitly fore-
closed a section 1985(3) action based on deprivation of a state statutory right
or a federal statutory right which includes a comprehensive remedial scheme.
In Novotny, the plaintiff, a male, expressed support for female employees at a
43. (1976). The statute criminalizes a conspiracy to intimidate any citizen in
the exercise of his rights given him by the constitution or laws of the United States.
44. 383 U.S. at 755. Nearly all of the protections of the Bill of Rights are
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 652 (1972); Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516 (1884).
45. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971). Though the thirteenth
amendment basis may seem limited, Congress does have the power to declare acts as
constituting badges of slavery. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439,
440 (1968).
46. 403 U.S. at 106.
47. Id. In Griffin, the Court explained that rights of national citizenship are
within the power of Congress to protect by appropriate legislation. Id. Therefore, it
could be argued that Griffin stands for the principle that all rights of national citizen-
ship are proper bases for a section 1985(3) cause of action without regard to any state
action requirement.
The constitutional rights of national citizenship are derived from the privileges and
immunities clauses of article IV, section 2 and the fourteenth amendment. On the gen-
eral subject of rights of national citizenship, see A. LIEN, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); A. LIEN, CONCURRING OPINION (1957);
KURLAND, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"?,
1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405; Lomen, Privileges and Immunities Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 18 WASH. L. REV. 120 (1943).
48. 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979).
[Vol. 50
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meeting of the board of directors of a private corporation.49 Subsequently he
was fired. He brought suit under section 1985(3), claiming injury by a con-
spiracy because of his support for Title VII rights of female employees. The
Court centered its discussion on the deprivation of "federal" rights.50 By nega-
tive implication, this apparently eliminates the deprivation of a state-law right
as a proper basis for a section 1985(3) cause of action.51 Second, Novotny
refused to allow a section 1985(3) suit based on Title VII, a federal statute,
because it contained a comprehensive remedial scheme of its own.52 The Court
reasoned that to allow the section 1985(3) suit would bypass the administra-
tive process established by Congress in Title VII.53
In summary, the majority in Scott tightened the requirements for those
substantive rights protected by section 1985(3). No longer does section
1985(3) provide a remedy for all conspiracies directed at individuals solely on
the basis of their membership in a given class. When deciding if a right is
protected under section 1985(3), consider the following analysis:
What substantive right was violated?
1. Is it a right guaranteed by the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment?
If so, state action is required.
49. Id. at 369.
50. Id. at 376. The Court eventually denied relief to the plaintiff ruling that a
Title VII violation may not be asserted within the remedial framework of section
1985(3).
51. Whether a state statutory right can serve as a proper basis for a section
1985(3) cause of action is an undecided question. Since the Supreme Court has not
ruled directly on the issue, considerable room for disagreement is allowed within the
circuits.
Three arguments are offered to refute the "Novotny implication." First is the rul-
ing in McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977). The
court in McLellan permitted state statutory rights as a basis for section 1985(3) if the
state law was transgressed. In support of its holding, the court stated that one element
in the Griffin decision was that the alleged conspiracy encompassed violations of both
civil and criminal laws of Mississippi. Id. at 926. This reliance appears questionable
after the Scott decision where Justice White clearly reiterated the violations relied
upon in Griffin were the thirteenth amendment and the right to interstate travel. 103 S.
Ct. at 3358. The McLellan opinion has not been accepted by the Supreme Court but
likewise has not been rejected by the Court. It remains good law in the fifth and elev-
enth circuits. Second, the statement by Justice White in the Scott opinion recites the
second issue of the case, "whether respondents' action could be sustained under §
1985(3) as involving a conspiracy to deprive respondents of rights, privileges, or immu-
nities under state law . . ." 103 S. Ct. at 3358. By inference, the Court is accepting
that section 1985(3) can be used to recover for deprivations of a state statutory right.
Third is the fact that the "federal" limitation in Novotny was not crucial to the facts of
the case since the underlying claim involved a federal statutory right. The argument
would contend that the use of the word "federal" was inadvertent and not meant to
eliminate state statutory rights as bases for section 1985(3) suits.
52. 442 U.S. at 378. This is analogous to the ruling in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1 (1980), which precluded a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of any federal
statutory right if the federal statute contains a comprehensive remedial scheme.
53. 442 U.S. at 376.
1985]
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2. Is it a right guaranteed by the thirteenth amendment, privileges and
immunities clause, or right to travel?
If so, state action is not required.
3. Is it a right guaranteed by a federal statute?
If so, a section 1985(3) action is precluded if the statute contains a
comprehensive remedy.
4. Is it a right guaranteed by state statute?
If so, does your particular circuit allow a section 1985(3) cause of
action?
The second area of dispute in Scott concerned the classes protected by
section 1985(3). Justice White characterized the union/non-union dispute as
an economic based classification. 54 Because the conspiracy involved an eco-
nomic, class-based animus, White held that section 1985(3) did not provide a
remedy.5 5 Following the 1971 decision of Griffin v. Breckenridge,5' White de-
clined to decide whether section 1985(3) extends to conspiracies motivated by
non-racial bias. 57 In dicta, White noted that even if section 1985(3) was con-
strued to reach conspiracies motivated by political bias, it does not reach con-
spiracies motivated by an economic, class-based animus.58
Justice Blackmun, for the dissent, asserted that section 1985(3) provides
a federal remedy for "all classes" seeking to exercise legal rights in circum-
stances where local laws and law enforcement efforts do not provide equal
protection to members of the class. 59 Because the plaintiffs were retaliated
against based on their non-union status, Blackmun supported section 1985(3)
protection. It appears that state and local law enforcement efforts to protect
the plaintiffs' rights were unsuccessful."0
54. 103 S. Ct. at 3361.
55. Id. White reasoned that labor disputes are adequately covered by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-69 (1982). As construed by the lower
court Scott decisions, section 1985(3) would infringe on the NLRA jurisdiction.
56. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
57. 103 S. Ct. at 3360.
58. Id. In examining legislative history, White concluded that the Ku Klux
Klan activities which the Act of 1871 intended to curtail were not based on an animus
against either labor or capital but were based on an animus against blacks and their
sympathizers. White then concluded that section 1985(3) was not meant to reach eco-
nomic, class-based animus. Second, White stated that economic conflicts should be
dealt with by statutes specifically addressed to such problems or by general law pro-
scribing personal injury. Id. at 3361.
59. Id. at 3367. In contrast with the majority, Blackmun categorized the early
Klan activities as an effort to resist the economic exploitation of the South. Since the
Act of 1871 was an attempt to reach such Klan activities, Blackmun believed section
1985(3) should be interpreted accordingly. Id. at 3368.
Blackmun interpreted the legislative history to create a functional definition of
those classes protected under section 1985(3). Rather than establishing a list of action-
able class traits, Blackmun advocated protection for all classes which are unprotected
(i.e. left vulnerable) by the states.
60. In his dissent, Blackmun noted that some victims of the union violence had
9
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The issue of the classes protected under section 1985(3) has its origins in
Griffin, where the Court established an intent requirement. 61 To recover under
section 1985(3), one requirement is that the conspiratorial discrimination be
motivated by some invidious, class-based animus.6 2 The Court, in Griffin, es-
tablished such an element to avoid section 1985(3) becoming a general federal
tort law.6
3
Before Scott, lower courts had searched for the outer limits of section
1985(3) protection. 6' Race was the obvious class subject to invidious discrimi-
nation.6 1 Other classes which the lower courts protected included women, 6 6
political groups,67 religious groups," and a single family unit.6 9 Numerous
other classes were excluded by some jurisdictions, including homosexuals, 0
debtors,71 bankrupts,7 2 tenant organizers,7 3 physicians,7 4 and union/non-union
trouble obtaining injunctive relief from the state courts against future episodes of vio-
lence. Id. at 3369 n.20.
61. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100-02 (1971).
62. Id. at 102. Another recent Supreme Court case, Kush v. Rutledge, 103 S.
Ct. 1483 (1983), ruled that no allegation of racial or invidious, class-based animus is
required to establish a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1982). The first part
of section 1985(2) relates to conspiracies which interfere with federal judicial proceed-
ings. The Court distinguished those actions which deal with processes of the federal
government from those which deal primarily with state concerns.
63. 403 U.S. at 102.
64. Courts are in agreement concerning the basic requirements of an invidious,
class-based animus. Those basic requirements are: (1) that the plaintiffs are victims
because of their membership in or affiliation with a particular class, not because of any
animus against the particular individual, see Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d
340, 345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981), and (2) that the class must
exist independent of the defendant's actions, i.e. that a group of victims does not make
a class, see Scott, 103 S. Ct. at 3367, (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The disagreement
among the courts arises when deciding which classes are protected by section 1985(3).
65. See, e.g., Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp. 570 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1978)
(employer discrimination against a black construction worker); Richardson v. Miller,
446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (white employee discharged for his views against em-
ployer's racially discriminatory employment practices).
66. See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.
1979) (women purchasers of disability insurance); Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F. Supp.
804 (D. Md. 1978) (woman employee received salary lower than employer's stated
minimum rate).
67. See, e.g., Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975)
(holder of protest sign along presidential motorcade); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608
(6th Cir. 1973) (distributor of campaign leaflets).
68. See, e.g., Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 907 (1982) (member of religious group kidnapped by parents); Marlowe v. Fisher
Body (General Motors Corp.), 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973) (employment discrimina-
tion based upon religious views held by employee).
69. See, e.g., Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972) (a single family);
Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1971) (married couple).
70. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
71. See Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979).
72. See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.
1985]
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Scott shed new light on the issue.78 Racial groups are absolutely pro-
tected;" economic groups are not.78 Protection for political classes is highly
disfavored.79 Protection for all other groups is left unanswered in Scott.80
Despite serious limitations, section 1985(3) can be used to provide a valu-
able remedy against conspiracies. Any conspiratory activity motivated by ra-
cial bias clearly can be reached under section 1985(3). Among those rights
clearly protected from private conspiracies are the thirteenth amendment right
to be free from badges of slavery, the implicit constitutional right to travel,
and those rights granted by the privilege and immunities clause. Section
1985(3) can also overlap 42 U.S.C. § 198381 to reach deprivations of constitu-
tional rights which involve state action. Still another possible use of section
1985(3) involves a remedy for conspiratory deprivation of federal or state stat-
utory rights.
An example of the type of case which survives Scott is Ward v. Connor.82
In Ward, the plaintiff became a member of the Unification Church. 3 Because
of his membership in the church, the plaintiff was kidnapped, held captive,
and subjected to deprogramming efforts by his parents and others acting in
concert. Plaintiff filed a section 1985(3) suit for deprivation of his constitu-
tional right to travel. In granting relief, the court concluded that the plaintiff
1977) (en banc).
73. See Carchman v. Korman Corp., 594 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 898 (1980).
74. See Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
930 (1973).
75. See, e.g., Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980) (employ-
ees who were discharged for complaining of employer's labor practices); Ohio Inns, Inc.
v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1976) (cancellation of government contracts because of
plaintiff's union dispute), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977).
76. In interpreting the Griffin invidious, class-based animus requirement, the
Court reaffirmed its position of avoiding the creation of a general federal tort law in
section 1985(3). But through Scott, the Court has in effect created a specific federal
tort law for racial discrimination in section 1985(3). When two or more conspire, with
racial animus, to deprive the plaintiff of his protected rights, he now has a choice of
actions: sue in state court on a tort action or sue in federal court on a section 1985(3)
action.
77. 103 S. Ct. at 3359.
78. Id. at 3360.
79. Id. at 3359.
80. Because the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue except for Scott, the
issue is left open to the circuits.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides a remedy to any person who is deprived
of their rights, under the constitution and laws, by a state actor.
82. 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982). Though
Ward involves a religious class-based animus which is questioned as sufficient for a
section 1985(3) action in some circuits, it is still illustrative of the type of case which
provides a basis for a section 1985(3) cause of action.
83. Id. at 46.
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had been deprived of his protected right to travel by two or more persons,
based upon his membership in the Unification Church.8 4
In Griffin v. Breckenridge in 1971, the United States Supreme Court re-
vived and revitalized 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). In its most recent case, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott, the Court has limited the use
of section 1985(3). Because of Scott, conspiracies motivated by economic bias
are not actionable under section 1985(3). Likewise, deprivations of fourteenth
amendment rights without state involvement are not actionable under section
1985(3). Though these limitations appear substantial, with proper study and
adherence to the statutory construction given section 1985(3), one can use the
statute to provide a federal remedy to a victim who was previously confined to
a prejudicial state court tort action.
In its divided opinion, the Court in Scott has taken one more step to guar-
antee that section 1985(3) does not become a generalized federal tort law. In
principal effect, section 1985(3) provides a specific federal tort law available to
attack conspiratorial discrimination based on race.
RICK E. TEMPLE
84. Id. at 48.
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